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abstract
Global trade and investment have become increasingly liberalized in recent
decades. This liberalization has lately been accompanied by substantive new
requirements for strong minimum standards of intellectual property (IP)
protection, which moves the world economy toward harmonized private
rights in knowledge goods. While this trend may have beneficial impacts in
terms of innovation and technology diffusion, such impacts would not be
evenly distributed across countries. Deep questions also arise about whether
such globalization of rights to information will raise roadblocks to the national
and international provision of such public goods as environmental protection,
public health, education, and scientific advance. This article argues that the
globalized IP regime will strongly affect prospects for technology transfer and
competition in developing countries. In turn, these nations must determine
how to implement such standards in a pro-competitive manner and foster
innovation and competition in their own markets. Developing countries may
need to take the lead in policy experimentation and IP innovation in order to
offset overly protectionist tendencies in the rich countries and to maintain the
supply of global public goods in an emerging transnational system of
innovation.
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i. introduction and conceptual framework
Economists studying international trade remain optimistic about the ability of
liberal trade policies and integration into the global economy to encourage
growth and raise people in poor countries out of poverty. For example, in a
recent speech at Duke University, the World Bank’s former Chief Economist,
Nicholas Stern, showed figures depicting a significant rise in per capita GDP
across developing countries as a whole in recent years.1 His point was that,
despite other obstacles to growth, more open markets, improved governance,
and increasing entrepreneurial activity were generating a positive impact in
poor countries. Even Oxfam, an organization that has been highly critical of
globalization, in a recent report recognized the role that open trade regimes
have played in providing greater opportunities for the impoverished to benefit
from extended markets.2

1

Nicholas Stern, ‘International Action for Fighting Poverty: An Historic Opportunity’, Lecture given
at Duke University (2 September 2003). See also J. H. Reichman, ‘Managing the Challenge of a
Globalized Intellectual Property Regime’, paper presented to the Second Bellagio Meeting on
Intellectual Property and Development, UNCTAD/ICTSD, 17–20 September 2003 (discussing
Stern’s thesis); David Dollar and Aart Kraay, ‘Trade, Growth, and Poverty’, manuscript,
Development Research Group, the World Bank, 2001 (on file with the authors).

2

Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation, and the Fight Against Poverty (2002).
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In general, we share this confidence but argue that a considerable
qualification needs to be made. Open trade and investment regimes work
best to encourage development and structural transformation where markets
for information and technology transfer are competitive in ways that permit
innovation, learning, and diffusion to flourish. Put differently, for poor
countries to take advantage of globalization opportunities, they need to
absorb, implement, and even develop new technologies.
An inability to do so risks increasing fragmentation and divergence from the
technology-driven world economy rather than growing integration and
convergence. Indeed, one could have applied Stern’s optimistic description
to the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe over the period 1950–
1975. They had high rates of savings (even if forced) and capital
accumulation, and were generating apparently high growth. However, these
economies failed to establish effective innovation systems: they lacked skills,
infrastructure, and the entrepreneurial culture that could encourage
competition and learning, and they relied instead on protected and inefficient
industrial behemoths. These establishments could not cope well with
competitive pressures dependent upon economic liberalization, and their
economies stagnated.
A different kind of technological roadblock may be facing developing
countries in their efforts to integrate into the world economy. A central
element in global policy is the ever-increasing levels of required protection for
information, technology, and creative activity through exclusive intellectual
property rights (IPRs). This trend is most evident in the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), a
component of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO).3 The TRIPS Agreement sets out a comprehensive set of minimum
protection standards that Members must observe and enforce with respect to
patents, copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, confidential business information, industrial designs, and integrated circuit designs.4 Even
stronger rules are being widely established through bilateral and preferential
trade agreements that the United States and the European Union have
negotiated with developing countries.5 Recent agreements reached at the
3

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 33
I.L.M. (1994) 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].

4

See e.g., J. H. Reichman, ‘Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under
the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement’, in C. M. Correa and A. Yusuf (eds), Intellectual
Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (1998) at 21–88; see generally Jayashree Watal,
Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (2001); Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual
Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries (2000).

5

See e.g., Peter Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property StandardSetting’, 5 J. World Intell. Prop. (2002) 765; Keith E. Maskus, ‘Strengthening Intellectual Property
Rights in Lebanon’, in B. Hoekman and J. Zarrouk (eds), Catching up with the Competition: Trade
Opportunities and Challenges for Arab Countries (2000), at 251–52.
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World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on the electronic transmission of works protected by copyrights or related rights6 and ongoing
negotiations at that organization on harmonization of patent rights7 continue
the drive to ratchet upward global protection regimes.
The evolving system of stronger private rights in new technologies could
lead to global gains in innovation and additional market-mediated information transfers to developing countries.8 Indeed, one can argue that the
harmonization of IPRs provides developing countries with tools for
technology-driven development that they would otherwise lack. By wisely
managing these tools, developing countries may obtain additional foreign
direct investment (FDI), more licensing of high-quality technologies, and
more access to advanced knowledge goods.
We do not dispute the potential for such outcomes, although we believe that
the scope for achieving them in different nations much depends on innovation
policies and other complementary factors.9 In this introductory article,
however, we raise some fundamental concerns about the implications of the
new regime for the ability of firms in developing countries to break into global
– or even domestic – markets and compete effectively. It seems increasingly
likely that stronger global IPRs could reduce the scope for such firms to
acquire new, and even mature, technologies at manageable costs. The natural
competitive disadvantages of follower countries may become reinforced by a
proliferation of legal monopolies and related entry barriers that result from
global minimum intellectual property (IP) standards. Such external restraints
on competition could consign the poorest countries to a quasi-permanent
status at the bottom of the technology and growth ladder.
We find it ironic that, as tariffs, quotas, and other formal barriers to trade
are dismantled, there has been a strong push to re-regulate world technology
markets. Although the ratcheting up of global IPRs could adversely affect the
growth prospects of developing countries, these nations have so far exerted
little influence on standard-setting exercises. Indeed, the progressive reregulation of world markets for knowledge goods is not driven by a broad
consensus of economic agents in the developed world. Rather, pressures to
elevate IP norms are exerted by powerful private interests whose lobbying

6

WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on 20 December 1996, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/94 (23 December 1996); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted by the
Diplomatic Conference on 20 December 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95 (23 December 1996); see
generally Pamela Samuelson, ‘The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO’, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. (1997) 369.

7

WIPO, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, Ninth
Session, Geneva, 12–16 May 2003, SCP/9/2, available at http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/documents/
session_9/pdf/scp9_2.pdf (visited 5 January 2004) [hereinafter Draft Patent Law Treaty]. See also
John H. Barton, ‘Issues Posed by a World Patent System’ [this symposium].

8

Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 2000), at 109–42.

9

Maskus, above n 8, at 199–232.
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activities hold sway in legislative and regulatory initiatives in rich countries
and international forums.
These efforts are largely detached from the traditional goal of domestic IP
systems to strike a balance between commercial profitability and publicinterest concerns. To the extent that this imbalance makes it harder for
entrepreneurs in developing countries to obtain inputs they need to compete
in the production of knowledge goods, these countries could discover that the
re-regulated global economy had in effect removed the rungs on which they
could advance.10
As private interests take precedence over public concerns, moreover, we
argue that the proliferation of exclusive rights could raise fundamental
roadblocks for the national and global provision of numerous other public
goods, including scientific research, education, health care, biodiversity, and
environmental protection.11 The architects of the new system evidently have
paid little attention to these issues, believing that a clear specification of strong
property rights could establish appropriate incentives for private development
of modalities to advance these and other public activities. In our view, the
greater likelihood is that the privatization of public-interest technologies could
in many cases erect competitive barriers, raise transactions costs and produce
significant anti-commons effects, which tend to reduce the supply of public
goods related to innovation as such, and also to limit the capacity of single
states to perform essential police and welfare functions not otherwise available
from a decentralized international system of governance.12
In Part I of this article, we set out some basic principles and observations
regarding the provision of global public goods (GPG) and how that provision
is implicated by the increasingly internationalized system of IP protection. In
Part II, we evaluate legal and organizational impediments to the creation and
diffusion of knowledge goods in a re-regulated global economy. In particular,
we point out that unbalanced IP regimes in developed countries may be
triggering counterproductive results and the concomitant risk that efforts to
lock in the temporary competitive advantages of powerful technology cartels
may raise costs for the developing world.
In Part III, we consider the seemingly paradoxical possibility that, as
developing countries experiment with their own IP regimes, and with
associated regimes of competition law and innovation promotion, they might
10

See e.g., International Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy 8–9, 11–27 (Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), 2002) [hereinafter CIPR].

11

See below text accompanying nn 100–127.

12

In this article, we offer only an overview of essential concepts regarding global public goods and their
interaction with IP protection. These issues are covered more extensively in other treatments. See
e.g., Peter Drahos, ‘The Regulation of Public Goods’ [this symposium]. For an extensive discussion
of the concepts and problems of provision and distribution of such goods, see Inge Kaul et al. (eds),
Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (New York: United Nations Development
Program, 2003) [hereinafter Providing GPG].
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re-inject a needed global stimulus to dynamic competition. They could also
contribute to the evolution of national and regional strategies to maintain the
supply of other essential public goods that has been compromised by the
crosscutting effects of efforts to privatize the creation and distribution of
knowledge and information as such.
A. International public goods and intellectual property rights
Global public goods might usefully be defined as those goods (including
policies and infrastructure) that are systematically underprovided by private
market forces and for which such under-provision has important international
externality effects.13 The concept that a good is ‘public’ stems from a
combination of nonrivalry in consumption and non-excludability in use.14 An
item is nonrival if its use by one actor does not restrict the ability of another
actor to benefit from it as well. A good is non-excludable to the extent that
unauthorized parties (‘free riders’) cannot be prevented from using it.
Classic examples include national defense, environmental protection, and
investments in new technical information. Each of these endeavors generates
results that are essentially nonrival and at least partially nonexcludable. In
consequence, private markets would not provide them at all or would do so at
deficient levels relative to those demanded by citizens. A role for government
thus arises to resolve this market failure.
Those concerned about the efficient provision of public goods must address
three fundamental issues.15 First, what are the optimal levels of the various
goods to be supported? The answer depends on the underlying demand for
such goods, and it may be difficult to reveal the preferences of citizens
accurately. Second, how are the desired goods to be provided? Note that
public policies may provide goods directly through taxes, subsidies, and
public production. Alternatively, policies may indirectly provide public goods
through such regulations as competition policy, intellectual property rights,
and price controls.
For example, IPRs provide a second-best resolution of the excludability –
also called appropriability – problem inherent in developing knowledge goods,

13

An ‘externality effect’ means that a failure to provide the public good imposes costs on third parties.
For example, pollution arising in some countries may affect health status in others, or financial
volatility in one nation may generate follow-on fragility elsewhere. In general, national policymakers
are not likely to consider the well-being of foreign citizens in setting their own policies regarding
public goods, which is why GPG require some form of global coordination. See Providing GPG,
above n 12; Daniel G. Arce, ‘Leadership and the Aggregation of International Collective Action’, 53
Oxford Economic Papers (2001) at 114–37.

14

Economic analysis of public goods has a long standing in the literature. See Paul A. Samuelson, ‘The
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’, 36 Review of Economics and Statistics (1954) 387–89; Todd
Sandler, Collective Action: Theory and Applications (1992).

15

See Providing GPG, above n 12 at 36–40.
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which could otherwise be distributed at the marginal cost of making copies.16
To the extent that such rights elicit benefits from investment that exceed these
social costs, they may be welfare enhancing over either market-driven
solutions or pure public provision and distribution.
A third question for policymakers is to determine the best jurisdictional
level for providing public goods. As a general rule, the more localized the
need, the narrower should be the jurisdiction. Thus, police, public schools,
and voting processes are typically seen as local obligations under United
States law and practice. National defense, macroeconomic policy, and foreign
policy are federal obligations.
How to organize the provision of GPG without adequate international
mechanisms has become a difficult and pressing question in recent years. In
practice, this function has been left largely to national or sub-national
authorities. Because there are international spillover impacts, however,
reliance on national provision likely fails to meet global needs efficiently or
equitably. Approaches to providing GPG are required at the international
level because national regimes generally disregard cross-border externalities
and the resulting need for policy coordination.
Many critical public goods have become increasingly global in their effects
and supply needs.17 It is fair to say that, whereas analysis of the need for
integrated systems has a long history, the actual organization, provision and
distribution of GPG are at an early and critical stage. This situation is well
illustrated by the emerging global system of IP protection. By long tradition,
IPRs were constituted as a national policy prerogative, with relatively little
attention paid to coordinating standards across countries. However, wide
variations in national regulations can have significant international static and
dynamic externalities.18
For example, recent economics literature points to several reasons why,
acting on their own interests, countries would tend to protect new technology
and product development at a level that is lower than would be globally
optimal.19 The main reason is that some of the gains from innovation accrue
to consumers and users in other countries, a benefit that framers of IPRs
would not take into account in setting domestic standards. Countries with
limited innovation capacities would logically free ride on foreign R&D
investments by offering only limited technology protection. Some means of
international coordination, perhaps within the ambit of the WTO, thus

16

See Maskus, above n 8, at 36–38.

17

See Providing GPG, above n 12.

18

Keith E. Maskus, ‘Regulatory Standards in the WTO: Comparing Intellectual Property Rights with
Competition Policy, Environmental Protection, and Core Labor Standards’, 1 World Trade Review
(2002) 135–52.

19

Philip McCalman, ‘National Patents, Innovation, and International Agreements’, 11 Journal of
International Trade and Development (2002) 1–14; Gene M. Grossman and Edwin L.-C. Lai,
‘International Protection of Intellectual Property’, manuscript, 2002; Suzanne Scotchmer, ‘The
Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties’, manuscript 2002.
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arguably would move global standards closer to the optimum by elevating
incentives to invest.
To be sustainable, however, this coordination should take into account the
development and social needs of different economies. In principle, this
objective calls for a mix of differential and flexible standards, along with
compensatory side payments to induce free riders to adopt and enforce
stronger IPRs.
To be sure, there is some flexibility permitted developing countries in
implementing the TRIPS standards.20 Yet, even the minimum TRIPS
requirements may overly burden poor nations in some circumstances.
Furthermore, to benefit from residual flexibilities requires a degree of legal
and regulatory expertise that may exceed the capacity of many countries for
the foreseeable future. While the WTO Agreement offers some scope for
implicit side payments through greater market access in developed countries
for exports from developing countries, progress in achieving such access has
been uneven.21 Thus, serious questions arise as to the sustainability of the
attempt in TRIPS to resolve the international externality aspects of protecting
new knowledge goods.
An additional criticism leveled at the emerging IPR system is that the
agenda for increasing protection has been articulated and pushed by richcountry governments effectively representing the commercial interests of a
limited set of industries that distribute knowledge goods. Even within some
developed countries, the tendency to espouse a protectionist IP agenda seems
more a reflection of policy capture than a reasoned attempt to balance
domestic needs, and the long-term effects on real innovation have yet to be
ascertained. At the global level, the virtual inability to date of public-minded
interest groups to affect this agenda raises further questions about the
sustainability of TRIPS and other elements of the system.22
If the initial impetus for a trade-related intellectual property initiative was to
prevent wholesale duplication of high-tech products, the TRIPS Agreement
went well beyond that objective. Whether it strikes an appropriate balance
between the needs of developers, users, and public authorities on a global
scale remains open to question. At least in the short run, it seems likely to shift
the rules sharply in favor of IP developers,23 while the potential for long-term
gains for the poorest countries seems cloudy at best.24
20

J. H. Reichman, ‘From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPS
Agreement’, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. (1997) 11.

21

See e.g., World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2002 at 37–64 (2001).

22

See e.g., World Bank, above n 21, at 145–49 (2001); Carlos M. Correa, ‘Internationalization of the
Patent System and New Technologies’, 20 Wisconsin Int’l L. J. (2002) 523, 544–50.

23

Philip McCalman, ‘Reaping What you Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent
Harmonization’, 55 J. Int’l Economics (2001) 161–86.

24

Maskus, above n 8; Pamela J. Smith, ‘How Do Foreign Patent Rights Affect U.S. Exports, Affiliate
Sales, and Licenses?’, 55 J. Int’l Economics (2001) 411–40.
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We have suggested that the emerging international IP system bears
characteristics of a GPG but that it seems flawed in execution and design.
Moreover, this regime influences the ability of governments to provide other
public goods. First, TRIPS constrains them from pursuing certain avenues for
promoting imitation, innovation, and related social policies. Second, stronger
private rights in information may raise roadblocks against deploying new
technologies that could help improve the provision of environmental
protection, health care, biological diversity, and basic scientific research.
These topics are examined below in Part II.
B. Technology transfer after the TRIPS Agreement25
The international flow of technological information and its successful
integration into domestic production and management processes are central
to the ability of firms in developing countries to compete in the global
economy. Technological change is a principal source of sustained growth in
living standards and is essential for the transformation and modernization of
economic structures. In most instances, developing countries find it cheaper
and faster to acquire foreign technologies than to develop them with domestic
resources. Such technologies may ‘spill over’ into wider improvements in
productivity and follow-on innovation in the domestic economy.
International technology transfer (ITT) is a comprehensive term covering
mechanisms for shifting information across borders and its effective diffusion
into recipient economies. It refers to numerous complex processes, which
range from innovation and international marketing of technology to its
absorption and imitation. There are also many different channels through
which technology may be transferred. One major conduit consists of trade in
goods, especially capital goods and technological inputs. A second is foreign
direct investment (FDI), which generally transfers technological information
that is newer or more productive than that available from local firms. A third
is technology licensing, which may occur either within firms or between
unrelated firms. Licenses typically involve the purchase of production or
distribution rights and the technical information and know-how required to
exploit them.26
There are also important non-market channels of ITT. Perhaps most
significant is the process of imitation through product inspection, reverse
engineering, and trial and error. A related mechanism is triggered when
technical and managerial personnel leave a firm and start a rival firm based on
25

This section draws on Keith E. Maskus, ‘Encouraging International Technology Transfer’, draft
report to UNCTAD/ICTSD, 2003.

26

James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskus, ‘General Equilibrium Approaches to the Multinational
Firm: A Review of Theory and Evidence’, in K. Choi and J. Harrigan (eds), Handbook of International
Trade (2003) at 320–49; A. Arora et al., Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and
Corporate Strategy (2001), at 115–42.
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information learned in the original location. Still another means is to study
information available from patent applications. Thus, patents provide both a
direct source of technology transfer, through FDI and licensing, and an
indirect source through legally regulated disclosures. Indeed, ‘trade in ideas’
is a significant factor in world economic growth, and developing economies
could gain considerably more access to foreign technologies as international
firms take out patents in their locations.27 Nevertheless, this benefit remains
dependent on local abilities to learn from incoming technological information,
and on the diffusion practices or strategies of technology-exporting firms.
Much knowledge appears to be transferred through the temporary
migration of students, scientists, and managerial and technical personnel to
universities, laboratories, and conferences located mainly in the developed
economies. Finally, technical information may be available from the public
domain, making it free for taking, or from a research commons accessible with
certain restrictions.28
International markets for trading technologies are inherently subject to
failure due to distortions attributable to concerns about appropriability,
problems of valuing information by buyers and sellers, and market power, all
strong justifications for public intervention at both the domestic and global
levels. Technology developers are interested in reducing the costs and risks of
making transfers, along with protecting their rights to profit from them. They
argue that effective protection and policy supports for markets are necessary
to increase the willingness of innovative firms to provide knowledge about
their production processes to firms in developing countries. Technology
importers are interested in acquiring knowledge and products at minimal
cost. Some observers argue that this objective is best met by limiting the
exclusive rights to exploit technology.29

27

Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum, ‘Trade in Ideas: Patenting and Productivity in the OECD’, 40
J. Int’l Economics (1996) 251–78.

28

See e.g., J. H. Reichman and Paul Uhlir, ‘A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment’, 66 Law & Contemp.
Probs. (2003) 315 [hereinafter A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons]. See generally J.
M. Esanu and Paul Uhlir (eds), The Role of Scientific and Technical Data and Information in the Public
Domain (National Research Council, 2003) [hereinafter Role of Scientific and Technical Data].

29

Theory favoring IPRs may be found in I. Horstmann and J. R. Markusen, ‘Licensing versus Direct
Investment: A Model of Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise’, 20 Canadian Journal of
Economics (1987) 464–81; A. Arora, ‘Contracting for Tacit Knowledge: The Provision of Technical
Services in Technology Licensing Contracts’, 50 Journal of Development Economics (1996) 233–
56. For a critical view, see Carlos M. Correa, ‘Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology
Transfer to Developing Countries?’, in Keith Maskus and J. H. Reichman (eds), International Public
Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge University
Press, forthcoming (2004)) [hereinafter International Public Goods and Intellectual Property].
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While the close and complex relationships between intellectual property
rights and ITT cannot be fully discussed here,30 it is useful to consider some
of the main impacts, both positive and negative, that stronger global IPRs may
have on international information flows. First, the preponderance of
econometric studies suggests that market-mediated flows of technology
respond positively to the strengthening of patent laws across countries. This
finding applies to international trade flows, especially in patent-sensitive
industries and capital goods, as regards patents in middle-income and large
developing countries.31 However, trade flows to poor countries seem
unresponsive to patent laws. Similarly, recent studies of patents and inward
FDI find positive impacts on more advanced and larger developing countries,
but not on poor and small countries.32 Licensing volumes between US firms
and unrelated concerns in larger developing countries also expand with the
rigor of local patent regimes.33
A reasonable interpretation of these findings is that there are threshold
effects in market-based licensing. Economies with low incomes and limited
technological capacity present neither attractive markets nor a competitive
imitation threat. Because their intellectual property regimes are not
particularly important in attracting ITT, it seems unlikely that the standards
implemented in compliance with TRIPS will encourage additional technology
transfer to the poorest countries. However, at higher incomes and
technological capacities, IPRs become an important factor in this regard,
even though they are only one of a list of variables that influence ITT. Other
important factors include effective infrastructure, efficient governance,
market size and growth, and proximity to suppliers and demanders.34
The literature also suggests that stronger patent rights may be expected to
raise considerably the rents earned by international firms as patents become
more valuable, with the result that firms in developing countries would pay
more for the average inward protected technology.35 Expansion of breadth,
scope, and length of patents would tend to amplify this result. Thus, there are
countervailing impacts in middle-income countries: higher volumes of ITT

30

See e.g., Keith E. Maskus, ‘The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct
Investment and Technology Transfer’, 9 Duke J. Compar. & Internat’l L. (1998) 109–61; Kamal
Saggi, International Technology Transfer: National Policies, International Negotiations, and Multilateral
Disciplines, report to Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003.

31

See Smith, above n 24; Keith E. Maskus and Mohan Penubarti, ‘How Trade-Related Are
Intellectual Property Rights?’, 39 J. Int’l Economics (1995) 227–48.

32

Smith, above n 24; Maskus, above n 8.

33

Guifang Yang and Keith E. Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: An Econometric
Investigation’, 127 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (2001) 58–79; Michael Nicholson, ‘Intellectual
Property Rights and International Technology Transfer: The Impact of Industry Characteristics’,
US Federal Trade Commission, manuscript, 2002.

34

Markusen and Maskus, above n 26.

35

McCalman, above n 19; The World Bank, above n 21, at 132–34.
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but increased payments per unit of technology. Moreover, recipient countries
are more likely to benefit where the supply of technologies is competitive and
local firms are capable of adapting them effectively into production
processes.36
While the evidence supports the claim that TRIPS standards could enhance
ITT (at least into the larger and more advanced developing economies)
through better performing technology markets, it should be weighed against
national historic experience. Few now-developed economies underwent
significant technological learning and industrial transformation without the
benefit of weak intellectual property protection.37 A good example is Japan,
which from the 1950s through the 1980s pursued an industrial property
regime that favored small-scale innovation, adaptation and diffusion, and the
licensing of new technologies. Key features of this system included pre-grant
disclosure, rapid opposition to patent grants, narrow patent claims, local
reliance on utility models and advantages for licensing.38 Another example is
South Korea, which in the 1970s encouraged domestic firms to acquire and
adapt mature technologies available on international markets for purposes of
developing local innovation capacities.39
The extent to which the emerging global IP regime may be expected to
enhance or impede ITT thus poses a complicated question. Answering it is
made even harder because technology transfer across borders involves a
mixture of private activities and public measures of encouragement (or
discouragement). This mixture varies in cost and efficiency by sector,
country, and over time, which suggests that globalized IP protection could
have both complex and sub-optimal effects unless accompanied by appropriate complementary policy approaches.40
The new system raises entry barriers for firms and competition in the
poorest countries, while even the middle-income nations find their scope of
action limited. Market distortions due to misuses of intellectual property
rights may also be harder to detect or police in developing than in developed
countries. Moreover, new or relatively untested forms of intellectual property
protection that choke access to upstream information inputs – including
scientific and technical data as such – could narrow access to the research

36

Maskus, above n 25.

37

Z. Khan, ‘Intellectual Property and Economic Development: Lessons from American and European
History’, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, background paper 1A, 2002; N. Kumar,
‘Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic Development: Experiences of Asian
Countries’, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights background paper 1B, 2002.

38

Janusz A. Ordover, ‘A Patent System for both Diffusion and Exclusion’, 5 J. Economic Perspectives
(1991) 43–60.

39

Linsu Kim, ‘Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights: Lessons from Korea’s
Experience’, UNCTAD/ICTSD working paper, 2002.

40

Maskus, above n 8, at 143–60.
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commons and limit other transfer mechanisms, with incalculable long-term
effects on ITT as it used to occur.41
In our view, governments in developing countries need to be pro-active in
ensuring that the net effect of expanded IP protection is to enhance access to
technology and to encourage its domestic adaptation and diffusion. Potential
gains in dynamic competition are reason enough for this approach. An
additional important factor is that tightened protection raises significant
questions regarding the ability to access international technology and
information to improve the provision of broader public goods. In the rest of
this article we explore these issues in more detail.

ii. re-regulating the global marketplace to protect
knowledge as a private good
One paradox of an increasingly global economy is that it ultimately requires
collective action to further enhance the social benefits of free competition in
an unruly marketplace that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO) have progressively liberated from state-imposed barriers to trade.42
Who should take responsibility for this regulatory task in the absence of any
duly constituted global governance authority and how to identify measures
that would actually promote global welfare without creating disguised barriers
to trade remain daunting problems for a decentralized international system.43
Nowhere are these tensions more acute than in the knowledge goods sector
of the world economy, a sector that is the most dynamic of all in terms of
potential growth and yet partially resistant to any consensus-based economic
analytical framework. Here, according to classical intellectual property theory,
knowledge begins life as a public good available to all and as an input into the
generation of additional knowledge. It subsequently becomes artificially
scarce as states grant IPRs to stimulate investment in the production of
private knowledge goods. The resulting tensions between the long-term
41

See e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is this
Market Failing or Emerging?’, in Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of
Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (2001) 223–49 [hereinafter Expanding
the Boundaries of IP]; Arti Kaur Rai, ‘Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science’, 94 Northwestern U.L. Rev. (1999) 77; J. H. Reichman, ‘Database Protection
in a Global Economy’, 2002 Revue Internationale de Droit Economique (2002) 455–504; J. H.
Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Data?’, 50 Vand. L. Rev. (1997)
51.
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benefits of these legal monopolies, which tend to elevate the level of
competition over time,44 and the social costs of restraining competition in the
meanwhile45 are recognized in Article XX(d) of the GATT itself.46 This
provision, which generally assigns responsibility for enacting IPRs to the
WTO Members’ domestic legislatures, admonishes them to observe a
criterion of reasonable necessity and to avoid ‘disguised restriction[s] on
international trade’.47
A. Legal and organizational impediments to the creation and diffusion
of knowledge goods
Drawing the lines between knowledge goods accessible to all and those
subject to private property rights has always been a delicate, controversial,
and economically uncertain task in even the most developed economies.
Periods of relatively weak and relatively strong levels of protection have
alternated over time, often at fairly short intervals, with little consensus in law
or economics about the cumulative lessons to be learned. How to ensure that
the social benefits of maximizing investment in current innovation are not
offset by the social costs of deterring future innovation and impeding current
competition is no clearer today than it was 50 years ago.48 The question has
become especially difficult to answer with regard to newer, cutting-edge
technologies that obstinately refuse to behave like the traditional technologies
of the industrial revolution.49
Today, moreover, the regulation of knowledge goods in national markets
impinges on the provision of other public goods – health, education, scientific

44
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What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us’, in F. Scott Kieff (ed), Perspectives on
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research, agriculture and the environment – in ways that were virtually
unknown to previous generations. The centrality of innovation in dynamic
developed economies has fostered a process of ‘enclosure’ and privatization
that increasingly threatens the provision of those other public goods that
citizens take for granted and identify with the very exercise of state
sovereignty.50
When these unresolved tensions between public and private interests in the
production of knowledge goods are transferred from their territorial base in
nation states to the nascent world market, they become far more acute. This
follows because the stakes are much higher,51 empirical evidence with which
to assess the conflicting claims of high and low protectionists remains scarce,
and nations have varying economic interests. The adverse effects of these
uncertainties are then made worse by another paradox of the international
trading system that one of us emphasized at the start of the Uruguay Round.
Here we refer to the tendency of rich countries, that traditionally urged free
competition on the rest of the world, to demand strong legal monopolies to
protect private knowledge goods in international trade, and the tendency of
poor countries to want unbridled competition with respect to these same
knowledge goods, most of which are produced at great cost in the technologyexporting countries.52
1. Preserving temporary competitive advantages with international intellectual
property standards
To understand why new distortions in the global market for knowledge goods
seem to crop up faster than the old ones disappear, it is well to recognize that
there is even less consensus among economists about how to regulate the
global market for knowledge goods than exists in successful national markets,
and that these uncertainties are aggravated by inequalities between rich and
poor nations. The need to set standards ex ante – in order to reduce the public
good character of facts, ideas, discoveries, and research results in favor of
developing private knowledge goods – then compounds all the governance
problems that beset transnational regulatory exercises in general.53
50
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Property, above n 29; Mark Lemley, ‘Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justification for Intellectual Property’,
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There is, for example, no expert body of legal and economic scholars
charged with disinterested analysis of these issues, or with the collection of
systematic inputs from all affected interests. The one agency entrusted with
managing intellectual property rights at the international level – the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) – has recently interpreted its
legislative mandate as one of progressively elevating intellectual property
rights throughout the world. Whether this strategy actually benefits
innovation or the world’s inhabitants seems to count for little in implementing
this mandate.54
Even if this ‘democratic deficit’ were overcome, differences of resources,
institutional capabilities, and organization could still combine to create both a
knowledge gap and a power gap at the regulatory center owing to the
inexperience and ineffectiveness of the developing countries as a whole to
manage their interests in this sector. Most of these states do not yet treat
intellectual property as an integral part of national or regional systems of
innovation. They are compliance oriented, not given to interagency review of
the issues, but rather prone to leaving them to their Intellectual Property
bureaus and to bartering concessions in this area for advantages in other
areas, without any solid basis for calculating the true costs and benefits of
these tradeoffs.55
Most developing countries lack access to impartial technical assistance, and
must rely instead on assistance funded by sources whose interests are not
necessarily in line with theirs.56 They are also advised by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), which have managed to produce an impressive array
of public-oriented outcomes in an increasing number of forums.57 Yet, good
as they sometimes are in tactical maneuvers on well-defined issues, such as
public health, the NGOs’ contribution cannot compensate for the general
inability of the developing countries to integrate multilateral negotiations into
broader national and regional innovation strategies.58
Those few developing countries that have built some capacity to participate
in standard-setting exercises may run into coercive pressures from govern-
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ments and corporations whose interests they challenge. Increasingly, such
pressures are exerted in bilateral, unequal bargaining situations in which everhigher IPRs are demanded without regard to the legal or political
consequences of undermining the basic MFN principles of the GATT itself.59
In effect, this regulatory gap at the center is left at the mercy of powerful
state actors representing the interests of corporate clients at the international
level. These clients, which may constitute a de facto ‘knowledge cartel’,60
control the distribution of a disproportionately large share of existing
technologies without necessarily being particularly innovative themselves.
Their membership typically does not include the small- and medium-size
entrepreneurs, who drive innovation in the United States, nor does it include
the universities and public research institutes who depend on constant access
to facts, data, discoveries, and the research results of others.
Because the members of this knowledge cartel depend on sales of existing
innovation, they push their governments to regulate the global market in ways
that lock in temporary competitive advantages without necessarily advancing
the global public interest in innovation, competition, or the provision of
complementary public goods. Indeed, representatives of the global public
interest are unlikely to be seated at the table where hard-law negotiations take
place.61 Without a legitimizing governance process that adequately represents
all stakeholders, the baseline need to support both public and private interests
in the transnational market for knowledge goods thus risks being compromised in at least two ways.
First, there is a pronounced risk that a substantial component of the
recently liberated global trade market will become re-regulated through IPRs
to reflect dubious practices in developed markets for knowledge goods that
may actually hamper both innovation and competition in the long run.
Second, there is the further risk that an over-regulated market for knowledge
goods could compromise the ability of nation states to supply other public
goods that only they can provide in a decentralized world economy.
2. Instability and loss of balance in developed intellectual property regimes
The drive to stamp out free-riding practices thus tends to obscure serious
problems engendered by the radical transformation of IP policies that has
occurred in developed countries. This transformation constitutes a prolonged
effort to strengthen the protection of investors in cutting-edge technologies,

59
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especially computer programs and biogenetically engineered products, which
fit imperfectly within the classical patent and copyright paradigms.62
Under the classical IP system, as implemented in the United States through
the mid-1960s, for example, the strong legal monopolies of the patent law
protected only a narrow layer of discontinuous inventions that fell outside the
technical trajectories guiding the day-to-day application of normal scientific
discoveries.63 Entrepreneurs constrained to innovate in a highly competitive
economy looked to the liability rules of unfair competition law, especially
trade secret law, to provide natural lead time in which to recoup their
investments, and to the rules of trademark law to maintain a foothold in the
market based on their reputations as producers of quality goods.64 Because
copyright law excluded industrial products in virtually every form,65 their
producers could not hope to avoid the rigors of competition by masquerading
as authors of literary and artistic works. As for the rest, vigorously enforced
antitrust laws, supplemented by a robust doctrine of patent misuse, rid the
market of deleterious patent pools and other barriers to entry and, in the view
of Professors Mowery and Rosenberg, by disciplining Bell Labs and IBM,
paved the way for the technological leaps of the 1970s and 1980s.66
This classical system of intellectual property protection obliged innovators
to look to the public domain for the basic inputs of most technological
development. They took the availability of vast amounts of governmentgenerated or government-funded scientific data and technical information for
granted; and they assumed that facts and data generated by non-confidential
public research endeavors at universities and other nonprofit institutions
would become public goods available to all.67 Investors also assumed that
sub-patentable innovations could be reverse-engineered by proper means that
would endow competitors with improvements and lower cost modes of
production. They further assumed that even patented inventions would enter
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the public domain at fairly short intervals and that it was not inordinately
difficult to work around these inventions if the commercial payoffs justified
the effort. However, basic underlying scientific discoveries would remain
freely available.
If we now fast forward to a descriptive analysis of the current US system,
one could hardly imagine a starker contrast. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, entrusted by Congress to manage the patent
system, has deliberately remolded that system to protect investment as such,
rather than discontinuous technical achievements that elevate the level of
competition. The patent system has accordingly degenerated to protecting
incremental slivers of know-how applied to industry, including those very
business methods that were formerly the building blocks of the free-enterprise
economy.68
The copyright system, expanding in the same direction, now confers
virtually perpetual protection on computer software and digital productions of
all kinds, and it encourages creators to surround even their unprotectable
technical ideas and components with untouchable electronic fences.69 Once
surrounded by these fences, even the underlying facts and data may be put off
limits; while one-sided electronic adhesion contracts may override public
interest exceptions favoring education and public research, and they may even
prohibit reverse engineering by honest means.70
As hybrid IP regimes multiply to fill still other perceived gaps in the system,
there are virtually no products sold on the general products market that do
not come freighted with a bewildering and overlapping array of exclusive
property rights that discourage follow-on applications of routine technical
know-how.71 Weak enforcement of antitrust laws then further reinforces the
barriers to entry erected upon this thicket of rights, while the need to
stimulate and coordinate investment in complex innovation projects justifies
patent pools, concentrations of research efforts, and predatory practices
formerly thought to constitute misuses of the patent monopoly.72
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The end results of this process, which James Boyle has felicitously called the
‘Second Enclosure Movement’,73 are not fully known, but the problems it is
already causing for developed systems of innovation shed light on the larger
problems facing the international economy. The availability of upstream data
and scientific information from the public domain is shrinking at the very
moment when advances in Internet technologies make it possible to link both
centrally located and distributed data repositories as never before. A growing
thicket of rights surrounds gene fragments, research tools, and other upstream
inputs of scientific research, and the resulting transaction costs impede and
delay research and development undertaken in both the public and private
sectors.74 Lost research and competitive opportunities appear to be
mushrooming as exchanges of even government-funded research results
become problematic.75 As well-known economists point out, complex
research and development projects at every level – whether public or private
– will become increasingly impracticable if too many owners of too many
rights have to be tithed along the way.76
Meanwhile, the sharing norms of science and the principle of open access to
data have begun to break down as universities commercialize publicly funded
research products. New intellectual property rights in collections of data –
adopted in the EU and pending adoption in the US77 – further undermine
these norms by enabling scientists, universities, and entrepreneurs to retain
control of data and technical information even after the publication of
research results in articles or after public disclosure for purposes of filing
patent applications on such results.78
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These and other social disutilities cast light on the problems afflicting the
international system and raise serious questions about its future prospects.
They represent the unintended consequences of an excess of regulation and
interference with market forces. In allowing large multinational firms to lock
in temporary advantages,79 the IP system could discourage innovation by
those same small and medium-sized firms that depend on access to public
domain inputs for developing applications of new technologies.
In this environment, economists fear that the ratcheting up of intellectual
property standards will boomerang against the capacity to innovate in
developed countries.80 They ask whether the breakthrough inventions of the
recent past would still be possible in a protectionist environment and in the
presence of a shrinking public domain.81 They make us question whether
future innovation will flourish in a dynamic, transnational system of
innovation liberated from excessive governmental regulation or flounder in
a re-regulated, ever more anti-competitive market that increasingly resembles
the top-down economies that trailed behind US high-tech industries in the
past.
3. Exporting a dysfunctional system to the rest of the world?
Logically, the shift to a high-protectionist agenda in the developed countries
should spark a cautious and skeptical response from the rest of the world for a
number of reasons. First, the TRIPS Agreement itself, coupled with the
WIPO Copyright Treaties of 1996,82 foreshadowed a revolutionary transformation of the legal and economic infrastructures in developing countries, and
they need a lengthy period of time in which to digest and adjust to these
reforms. These countries can hardly absorb the unknown social costs of new
intellectual property burdens when the real costs of the last round of
legislative initiatives are still making themselves felt.83 Yet, this reality has not
attenuated the pressures for TRIPS-plus standards in both multilateral and
bilateral forums.
A second reason for diffidence in developing countries is the scholarly
debate that the high-protectionist agenda has generated in both the United
States and Europe, and the corresponding fears that this agenda could harm
investment and research-based innovation in the long run. If the critics prove
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right, then the last thing the developing countries should want to do is to
emulate these policies.
Consider, for example, that the drive to further harmonize the international
minimum standards of patent protection at WIPO84 has occurred at the very
time when the domestic standards of the United States and the operations of
its patent system are under critical assault. That country’s patent system has
been subject to scathing criticism in numerous law journal articles,85 in the
scientific literature,86 and even in magazines of general circulation.87 New
proposals to reform both the domestic and international patent systems
appear frequently, and commissions to study or propose reform are operating
on numerous fronts.88 How, under such circumstances, could it be timely to
harmonize and elevate international standards of patent protection – even if
that were demonstrably beneficial – when there is so little agreement in the
US itself on how to rectify a dysfunctional apparatus that often seems out of
control?
Even in the courts themselves, which, in the United States, still operate at
some degree of removal from lobbying and other political pressures, there are
elements of change, uncertainty, and disarray that do not bode well for an
international standard-setting exercise. In the past few years, for example, the
US federal courts have significantly changed the way patent claims are
interpreted; narrowed the doctrine of equivalents in patent infringement
actions; practically eliminated the research exemption under which universities had operated for 50 years or more; expanded patent protection of
computer programs in ways that both the domestic and European authorities
84
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had previously opposed; and opened patent law to the protection of business
methods in ways that have disrupted settled commercial activities.89
These events should make US authorities cautious about surrendering the
power to undertake adjustments in the future, and policymakers in the rest of
the world should become wary of locking themselves into the untested results
of ad hoc judicial tinkering in a single country.90 It is therefore disconcerting to
think of ‘harmonizing’ the international patent system at such a time, when
the risks of unintended harm to worldwide competition seem high, and when
the only basis for a consensus on harmonization might be to squeeze out the
remaining flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement.
One can paint a similar picture with respect to copyright and related rights
laws. Here, the developing countries, acting in concert with user interests in
the developed countries, managed to ensure that the 1996 WIPO treaties
governing works transmitted in digital media continued to allow certain
privileged uses and exceptions permitted by prior law.91 Notwithstanding this
outcome at the international level, the United States and the European Union
both ignored these provisions and cut well back on permitted uses in their
domestic implementation laws;92 and they have been pressing developing
countries for still higher standards of protection in bilateral negotiations.
Yet, these domestic initiatives to expand and strengthen copyright
protection of works transmitted over digital telecommunications networks
have generated popular resistance to copyright norms in the United States as
well as strenuous academic concerns about free competition, free speech,
privacy, and the need to ensure access to inputs for future creative works.93
89
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Further harmonization efforts in this climate thus amount to a gamble from
which bad decisions and bad laws are far more likely to emerge than good
laws that appropriately balance public and private interests.
There are still other risks of participating in further harmonization exercises
that are even more sobering. First, certain new initiatives – such as the
European database protection right94 – could radically subvert the classical
intellectual property tradition built around patents and copyrights, with
unintended consequences that could elevate the costs of research and
development across the entire knowledge economy. While pressures to adopt
similar legislation in the United States mount, legal and economic analysis of
database protection as a generator of anti-competitive effects and of potential
obstacles to innovation also grow more refined and alarming.95 Such
premature initiatives could undermine sound economic development everywhere, and action in this regard at the international level would require great
caution under the best of circumstances.96
In this climate, it is difficult to see that developing countries have anything
to gain from new efforts to strengthen IP standards. As matters stand, these
international standard-setting exercises are not being conducted either to
promote their interests or the global public interest. On the contrary, the
developing countries play virtually no role in norm formation (partly due to
their disorganized institutional apparatus),97 and the global public interest is
hardly represented at the negotiating tables in the developed countries
themselves, much less in international forums where hard law is enacted.98
From this perspective, even if the developing countries possessed more
bargaining power than they do, they should remain wary of further
harmonization exercises in the absence of effective strategies for preserving
and enhancing the public good side of the equation. Until this gap in
international lawmaking has been suitably addressed, such initiatives will
continue to suffer from a basic design defect.
Any gains in efficiency of operations and lower transaction costs that greater
harmonization might entail are likely to be offset by losses of sovereign power
to control the single states’ own innovation policies; by a shrinking public
94
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domain; by still higher costs of technological inputs and reverse engineering;
and by growing thickets of rights that will make transfer of technology harder
for those operating outside patent and IP pools (pools that could soon include
major research universities as well as corporate holding companies). With
every rise in international IP standards, moreover, there will likely be a
corresponding loss of flexibility under the TRIPS Agreement and still greater
risks deriving from the possible claims of nonviolatory acts of nullification that
new standards may engender in the future.99
B. Impact of intellectual property standards on the reserved welfare
powers of WTO Members
An International Task Force on Global Public Goods was recently created at
the initiative of France and Sweden to explore further the concept of GPG, to
clarify the definition, and to propose concrete and operational recommendations to policymakers. In assessing how such goods could collectively be
harnessed to reduce poverty and enhance welfare, this group has given
priority to ‘peace and security; trade regimes; financial stability; control of
communicable diseases; and sustainable management of the national
commons’.100 A sixth item, ‘knowledge’, is also included in the list for its
‘classical public good properties’. However, the task force believes that this
rubric requires a separate and particular treatment owing to its ‘cross-cutting’
nature and to the ever-increasing role of knowledge as both a private and
public good.101
As programs like this one emerge to focus attention on the role of GPG in
advancing the welfare of developing countries, they increasingly encounter
obstacles and problems stemming from the existence of patents and other
IPRs held by universities, research institutes, and the private sector on
fundamental research technologies.102 These intellectual property rights may
play a positive role, especially when they enable private investors to take
publicly funded research results out of the laboratory and into the stream of
commerce.103 Increasingly, however, these rights have invaded the research
commons itself and made it both costly and difficult to obtain cutting-edge
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technologies needed for public health, agriculture, environmental protection,
and the provision of other public goods.104
Private capture of the global regulatory process for IP standard setting not
only undermines the ability of governments in developing countries to devise
and promote their own national systems of innovation. It also erodes national
control over the provision of non-TRIPS public goods by other affected ministries
that lack inputs into the intellectual property standard-setting exercises.
The risks of progressively entangling the WTO Members’ police and
welfare powers in the coils of IP treaties are aggravated by the poor
organizational capacities of developing countries and their lack of expertise,
which have so far impeded recourse to public-interest tools that the TRIPS
Agreement still makes available.105 They are further aggravated by the
practice of excluding those who disagree with the knowledge cartel from key
negotiating forums and from a disinclination to include those who speak for
the public interest or the preservation of complementary public goods in
‘technical’ standard-setting exercises.
The stakeholders excluded from the process of norm building in the field of
IPRs have not quietly faded away, but have, on the contrary, worked through
numerous NGOs to defend global public goods against further encroachment
in parallel or alternative forums. This strategy of ‘regime shifting’106 imitates
that of the knowledge cartel, which in the 1990s shifted the regulation of IPRs
from WIPO, whose secretariat at that time was overtly sympathetic to the
goals of developing countries, to the GATT (later to become the World Trade
Organization), where market power was the prevailing influence.
As Professor Laurence Helfer shows, these parallel efforts to balance the
private interests of intellectual property rights holders against larger public
interest goals have been increasingly successful with respect to public health,
biodiversity, plant genetic resources, human rights, and the protection of
traditional knowledge and culture.107 The most dramatic success came in the
104
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area of public health, where the NGOs’ campaign for access to essential
medicines culminated in the Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health, and in the supplementary decision of 30 August 2003.108 Also
noteworthy from this perspective is the work of NGOs within United Nations
human rights bodies, which ‘has led to the adoption of non-binding
declarations and interpretive statements that emphasize the public’s interest
in access to new knowledge and innovations and assert that states must give
primacy to human rights where the two sets of obligations conflict’.109
Professor Helfer identifies at least four different goals that NGOs have
striven to fulfill in these parallel regime-shifting initiatives. First, they seek to
promote and maximize desired policy outcomes that differ from those of IP
stakeholders, particularly where those policy outcomes ‘have been ignored or
marginalized in other international regimes’.110 Second, they have created
safety valves that help to relieve pressure for action at the WTO by
‘consigning an issue area to a venue where consequential outcomes and
meaningful rule development are unlikely to occur’.111 Third, regime shifting
focuses efforts on generating norms that operate to check or counter the goals
of the high-protectionist coalitions and thereby provide governments ‘a ‘‘safe
space’’ in which to analyze and critique those aspects of TRIPS . . . they find
. . . problematic’.112 Fourth, NGO activities seek to blend or integrate new
hard and soft law rules into both WTO and WIPO processes as a means of
focusing attention on other public goods besides innovation, and of enabling
‘developing countries to achieve outcomes not attainable’ in any single
negotiating forum.113
There are, of course, risks of overkill and unintended consequences
inherent in these regime-shifting exercises. Putting human rights behind the
108
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drive for access to essential medicines clearly strengthened the claims of those
dying from AIDS while governments debated the intricacies of patent law and
the effects of reference pricing on the cost of medicines in developed
countries.114 It has done little to clarify the complex problems of funding risky
research and development that lie at the heart of the patent system,115
although new NGO initiatives that focus specifically on devising alternative
research and development strategies may yield more promising results in the
future.116
Similarly, while the drive for legal protection of traditional knowledge under
some form of intellectual property right could give poor countries a bigger
stake in the global market for knowledge goods,117 it could further privatize
resources – especially genetic resources – that were previously treated as
agricultural public goods. It could also make innovation and creativity more
difficult in the very countries that are the richest suppliers of traditional
knowledge, especially if foreign firms that acquired these inputs subject to
‘benefit sharing’ royalty agreements were under no effective ancillary
obligations to share their technological know-how with the countries of
origin.118 Above all, legal protection of traditional knowledge could
boomerang against developing countries as a group if they were tempted to
trade it for a strong database protection treaty, as the European Union
proposes.119
In any event, the burgeoning encroachment of international IPRs on the
reserved welfare and police powers of states constitutes an anomaly in public
international law that must be fixed before it cripples the WTO and fatally
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weakens the infrastructure that supports world trade. One should not view
this as some minor irritant to be blamed on NGOs or recalcitrant developing
countries. Telling poor people in rich countries that the TRIPS Agreement
prevents domestic policymakers from regulating access to essential medicines
will not long remain politically feasible. As matters stand, if nothing had been
done to address the plight of millions dying of AIDS because of TRIPS patent
rights, then the WTO would have contributed to the greatest health tragedy in
history.120
Similar errors must be prevented in other critical areas. Until there are some
agreed global governance mechanisms for food security, agriculture, human
rights, public health, environmental protection, scientific research, and other
public goods, states cannot be presumed to have surrendered sovereign police
and welfare powers in the course of intellectual property standard-setting
exercises at which their ministries of health, education, agriculture, and public
welfare played little or no role.
Professor Robert Howse has suggested that WTO dispute-settlement panels
in cases covered by the TRIPS Agreement could attenuate such conflicts by
invoking article 8.1 of that Agreement.121 This provision recognizes the power
of states ‘in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, [to] adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development . . . [if] consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement’.122 It could allow panels to interpret TRIPS provisions in the
light of other relevant international laws, including ‘‘‘soft law’’ sources, such
as resolutions and authoritative reports and policy statements of relevant
international forums’.123
While endorsing this proposal, we think that respect for domestic authority
over the provision of public goods outside the TRIPS framework must
ultimately rest on a more solid foundation if the WTO’s own infrastructure is
to become stabilized over time. Here, perhaps, another lesson to be drawn
resides, by analogy, in the express list of reserved state police and welfare
powers set out in article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
120
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This provision subjects state power over intellectual property laws to a
criterion of ‘reasonableness’ when derogating from the pro-competitive
mandate of the GATT.124 It further subjects the exercise of reserved state
powers generally to two additional criteria, set out in the accompanying
chapeau clause, namely, that resulting measures shall not to be applied in ways
that ‘would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail’ or in ways that
constitute ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’.125
While the precise legal impact of these provisions on post-TRIPS state
action remains to be clarified, we think they point the way to a broader
principle. If the TRIPS Agreement is not to become a Trojan horse that
enabled corporate distributors of private knowledge goods to disrupt the
provision of global public goods, the continued exercise of WTO Members’
police and welfare powers must be buttressed by an implied or express
understanding that all international intellectual property standard-setting
exercises presuppose a kind of de facto ‘article XX’ limitation in reverse. States
that agree to engage in such exercises cannot thereby be tacitly understood to
waive or surrender these reserved powers.
On the contrary, and in conjunction with both the Preamble to the TRIPS
Agreement itself126 and article 8.1, it must be generally understood that the
implementation of international IP standards is necessarily limited by criteria
of reasonableness. These standards, as implemented, must not become
disguised barriers to the exercise of those other police and welfare powers that
are normally reserved to states.127
Where, in short, there is a conflict between private IPRs and the sovereign
preservation of other public goods affecting, for example, competition, public
health, sustainable agriculture, environmental protection, and the guarantees
of human rights, WTO panels should respect the reserved powers of states
unless they had expressly delegated their regulatory powers to some
international authority or otherwise explicitly bargained them away. In the
presence of any such conflict, moreover, WTO tribunals should place the
burden of proof on states defending private claimants to show that their
interpretation of the relevant international standards would meet these
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limiting criteria and would not unreasonably compromise the provision of
public goods otherwise reserved to states.

iii. balancing public and private interests in an emerging
transnational system of innovation
All countries could benefit from a functionally efficient transnational system
of innovation if low barriers to entry enabled entrepreneurs anywhere to invest
in the production and distribution of knowledge goods. The reduction of
trade barriers, the broadening of global capital markets, and the relative
harmonization of intellectual property standards could then channel the flow
of investments to innovators wherever they were situated and enable them to
access and utilize the technological inputs they needed, whether by purchase
or license. These same investors could then export the resulting knowledge
goods in the relative security that international minimum standards of IP law
would protect their respective lead time advantages against free riding
duplicators who contributed nothing to the collective costs of research and
development (R&D).128
In such a system, public safeguards should also enable digital telecommunications networks to link the providers of scientific and technical inputs in an
endless research commons.129 Global incentives to innovate would then
reward entrepreneurs who converted these inputs into value-adding, followon applications with unprecedented transnational payoffs.
In practice, however, economic realities in the post-TRIPS environment
may differ significantly from these potential outcomes.130 Objective difficulties of accessing technical information generated abroad and of adapting it to
local conditions still hamper the catch-up activities of firms in developing
countries. International IP standards augment these difficulties by elevating
the cost of inputs and by making the task of reverse engineering by honest
means more costly and sometimes impossible. Additional obstacles arise
when high prices charged for foreign technologies make locally produced
goods uncompetitive, when foreign suppliers refuse to license needed
technology at all, or when they impose unreasonable terms and conditions
that restrict exports and otherwise create barriers to entry.131
128
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We do not mean to overstate the case or to sound unduly pessimistic. The
reform of the worldwide intellectual property system has undoubtedly
improved the infrastructure supporting the exchange of knowledge goods,
and researchers have begun empirically to evaluate the positive contribution
to economic growth this makes possible.132 The case of the Indian software
industries, for example, shows just how fast small- and medium-sized
industries in developing countries can catch up once the relevant technical
know-how becomes embedded in an appropriate commercial environment.133 Impressive technological gains have also occurred in many other
countries, including Brazil, China, and South Africa.
The point is that, as a rudimentary transnational system of innovation
begins to take shape, it consists of many different components at different
levels of development whose intellectual property needs and interests vary
considerably. If, indeed, one looks beyond the North–South conflict of
interests that informed yesterday’s debates about IP standards, one might
better view the developing countries today as territorial economic arenas in
which a proportionately larger collection of small- and medium-sized
entrepreneurs operate without the benefits of basic research results available
to their counterparts in developed countries.
While the technical expertise of such firms lags well behind that of similarly
sized firms that drive innovation in, say, the United States, these are
differences of degree, not kind. All such firms tend to have more in common
with each other than they do with the large multinational companies that are
often not very innovative at all, but mainly powerful distributors of innovation
originating from smaller, more dynamic firms.
Like the biggest firms, small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs – wherever
situated – need IPRs to appropriate the fruits of their investments at home
and to facilitate sales, licensing, and direct investments abroad. They also
need these rights to defend themselves from the predatory practices of the
large multinationals.134 However, these firms would logically oppose the drive
for TRIPS-plus levels of intellectual property protection that tended to
expand and multiply exclusive rights, limit access to the research commons,
132
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and diminish the space for reverse engineering or other pro-competitive
strategies built around value-adding applications of new technologies.135
A. Developing countries as defenders of the competitive ethos
Because a disproportionately large number of such entrepreneurs may be
located in developing countries, governments in those nations could become
the defenders and promoters of a transnational system of innovation in which
properly balanced intellectual property rights were not ends in themselves,
but rather the means of generating more scientific and technical inputs into a
healthy competitive environment. To the extent that these governments
represented the interests of both consumers and follow-on innovators, they
would want to maintain the flows of publicly available scientific and technical
information that traditionally fueled innovation in the United States; to
preserve and strengthen the rights to reverse-engineer routine innovations by
proper means; to foster the exchange of technical know-how between
innovators at work on common technical trajectories; and to ensure that
regulatory solutions to overcome market failure did not create barriers to
entry or otherwise impoverish the public domain.136
To this end, the developing countries need to integrate the international IP
standards codified during the Uruguay Round into their national and regional
systems of innovation in ways that maximize the benefits and minimize the
social costs. This difficult and financially burdensome task requires them to
master and defend the flexibilities still residing in the TRIPS Agreement; to
match those flexibilities with their respective, often widely different
innovation assets and other comparative advantages; and to forge a procompetitive strategy with respect to the technologically more advanced
countries, within the confines that the WTO Agreement makes legally
possible.137
To succeed in this endeavor, there are at least three necessary, if not
sufficient pre-conditions. First, developing countries as a group need to halt
or opt out of new international intellectual property standard-setting exercises
that would only complicate their task and narrow their options. Second, they
will need to rationalize their decision-making and interagency governance
structures so as to coordinate the activities of their intellectual property
bureaux with policy decisions affecting the design of their national systems of
innovation. Third, they will have to dedicate significant efforts and resources
to conserving and promoting those public goods that are increasingly
undersupplied in developed countries but that remain indispensable to rapid
technological and overall social progress in developing countries.
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1. A moratorium on stronger international intellectual property standards
Building an effective transnational system of innovation is a sobering task
because the choice and disposition of optimal incentive structures have
become increasingly uncertain in both theory and practice, especially as
regards new technologies,138 and because neither high-protectionist interests
in developed countries nor low-protectionist interests in developing countries
could be expected to advocate principles appropriately balancing the needs of
innovators with those of followers.139 From this perspective, further
harmonization is not an improper goal, but rather a premature exercise
under the new and uncertain conditions that attend the development of
cutting-edge technologies generally and information-based technologies in
particular.
Here the single most daunting problem is how to allocate public and private
interests in such goods, given that their raw materials – information –
necessarily perform a dual function as both outputs and inputs of a
‘cumulative and sequential’ innovation process.140 As matters stand, the
complex nature and pace of cutting-edge innovation so outstrips the
conventional assumptions of the patent and copyright paradigms handed
down from the nineteenth century that disinterested economists and
policymakers in the most technologically advanced countries lack both the
experience and the evidence to draw these lines with confidence.
Contrary to the special interests’ relentless propaganda, in other words,
intellectual property law has not arrived at the end of history. On the contrary,
the turmoil generated by the TRIPS Agreement and its aftermath, including
the WIPO Copyright Treaties,141 suggests that we stand at the threshold of an
era in which unanswered questions about the role of IPRs in a networked
information economy demand a lengthy period of ‘trial and error’
experimentation, like that which ensued after the adoption of the Paris and
Berne Conventions in the 1890s.
In order to validate empirically the loose claims made for and against
different modes of protection, we will thus need a period of time in which
138
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states at different levels of development accommodate existing international
standards to their own nascent or evolving systems of innovation.142 This
would yield a new body of ‘laboratory effects’, to use Ladas’s phrase, with
which to compare and test different development strategies.143 In the long
run, the resulting empirical data could make it possible for states to trade
further intellectual property concessions on a win-win basis, without coercion
and with fewer risks that powerful interest groups had rigged the rules to lock
in fleeting competitive advantages.
The time has come, in short, to take intellectual property off the
international law-making agenda and to foster measures that better enabled
developing countries to adapt to the challenges that prior rounds of
harmonization had already bred.144 Such a moratorium would then enable
both high and low protectionist countries to test their respective strategies
against actual results without fear that the market openings nominally
available to developing country entrepreneurs would be foreclosed by
premature, ill-advised, or unbalanced efforts to re-regulate that same
marketplace at their expense.
A ‘time out’ along these lines would make it possible, for example, to
evaluate growing fears that overprotection of research results in developed
countries will produce anti-commons effects and lost competitive opportunities likely to retard the pace of innovation over time. It would allow room for
any countries so inclined to experiment with alternative forms of protecting
investment, including proposals for more open-source initiatives145 and for
compensatory liability regimes that could reconstitute the shrinking semicommons that historically mediated between exclusive intellectual property
rights and the public domain.146 It would allow time for the worldwide
scientific community to reformulate its data exchange policies and to
reconstruct contractually the public domain for scientific and technical
information that has recently come under a privatizing assault.147
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A moratorium on stronger international intellectual property standards
would especially help developing countries shift their attention and limited
resources away from compliance-driven initiatives148 toward programs to
potentiate their national and regional systems of innovation. It would, for
example, give them time to adapt promising new initiatives to their own
environments, such as programs to encourage the transfer of technology from
universities and public research centers to the private sector, which have
produced mixed results in the United States.149 It would also give them
breathing room in which to formulate competition laws and policies rooted in
fairness, in concerns to lower barriers to entry, and in the need to ensure that
market-induced transfers of technology were not thwarted by refusals to deal
and unreasonable licensing terms or conditions.150
Efforts to institute such a moratorium could, however, run up against
legitimate concerns in developed countries to prohibit free riding on
investments in new technologies that enter the global marketplace. Developing countries that demand a moratorium on stronger intellectual property
standards must therefore remain willing to oppose free-riding practices that
undermine incentives to invest in new technologies everywhere.151 A
willingness to accommodate legitimate concerns about free riding could
defuse potentially heated conflicts and remove controversial topics, such as
database protection, from a more ambitious standard-setting agenda.152 It
would also reinforce the credibility of a demand for a moratorium on further
harmonization efforts by accompanying it with a ‘clean hands’ doctrine that
would reassure investors in all countries.
2. An institutional infrastructure for reconciling existing IPRs with national and
regional systems of innovation
The minimum international standards of intellectual property protection
already mandated by the TRIPS Agreement are not uniform law, and WTO
Members retain considerable flexibility in the ways those standards can be
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incorporated into their domestic legal systems.153 The challenge for every
developing country is to enact laws and implement policies that, while
consistent with international minimum standards, also effectively promote
national development priorities.154 In so doing, single governments should
also take into account the possibilities of cooperative actions or strategies that
could reduce the overall social and economic costs of compliance with those
obligations for any given region as a whole.
All developing countries should accordingly consider the feasibility of
establishing a high-level, permanent working group on trade-related innovation policies, which could become the focal point for interagency review with
respect to the integration into domestic law of existing and evolving
international legal standards affecting innovation. These working groups or
advisory councils would not duplicate the activities of national IP bureaux.
They should instead play a supervisory role that requires inputs from those
bureaus but that subjects policy-making decisions of importance to a suitable
interagency review process concerned with national development strategy.155
Each regional or sub-regional group of developing countries should also
consider the feasibility of establishing a similar working group for the
purposes of coordinating positions on matters of common concern. These
regional councils, once established, could benefit from the pooling of
resources and expertise among their members to become centers for
formulating regional standards concerning IPRs and for consensus building
for future bilateral and multilateral negotiations bearing on innovation
policies.
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In putting forward these proposals, we make no assumptions that
developing countries would think alike on the relevant issues or that members
of any regional group will readily embrace a common position. The opposite
is true. What experience demonstrates is that any coalition of developing
country interests will be more effective than the absence of such a coalition.156
Compromise positions staked out by regional groups can block the most
egregious proposals emanating from special interest coalitions, and can
sometimes even lead to universally valid intellectual property legislation of
value to the developing countries.157
The organization of national and regional interagency working groups
would reduce the dependence of developing countries on ad hoc support by
foundations, NGOs, and pro bono legal counsel. The existence of such
organizations would further ensure early detection of new protectionist
initiatives, facilitate prompt reactions to them, and enable the formation of
coalitions to resist them if undesirable or to modify and support them if
desirable. It would also make it possible to appoint subcommittees that could
follow ongoing initiatives at WIPO and the WTO, and support the work of
permanent delegations and regional political caucuses at these and other
intergovernmental organizations on a continuing basis.
Above all, the existence of national and regional working groups on traderelated innovation policies would enable developing countries to formulate
broad-based strategies to resist pressures at the bilateral and multilateral levels
for undesirable demands for protection. Collective action to resist such
pressures seems more likely to succeed than leaving each state to fend for
itself, in which case there is simply no institutional infrastructure for
promoting a systematic and coordinated response to what has become a
systematic and coordinated drive to re-regulate the global economy.
B. Maintaining the supply of knowledge as a global public good
Critical to the future success of an emerging transnational system of
innovation is its ability to ensure the production and adequate supply of
needed public inputs known to have fueled the production of private
knowledge goods in the technologically most advanced economies.158 This
topic is relatively new and extremely complex, and the need for collective
international action has been inadequately studied.
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1. Dynamic properties of knowledge as a global public good
In thinking about the uncertain properties of knowledge as a global public
good, the intimate and complex relationship between knowledge and trade
requires particular attention, especially in light of the TRIPS Agreement and
related issues that were previously discussed. In principle, international trade
law rooted in the GATT and the WTO Agreement should stimulate
worldwide competition in the provision of goods and services generally,
including knowledge goods. At the same time, qualitative leaps in knowledge
as a product of aggregate investment in R&D also depend on private
intellectual property rights, especially patents, which deliberately restrain
trade in the short run in order to elevate the level of competition later on.159
In this process, knowledge plays at least a triple role. Existing knowledge
fuels the production of additional knowledge as an input from any commons
accessible to any given set of researchers or entrepreneurs. New knowledge
emerges fresh from publicly supported research endeavors, often involving
massive expenditures, whence it may enter a research commons, as typically
occurred in the United States, or it may attract proprietary rights of either a
public or private nature.160 Finally, new knowledge may come to light from
privately funded research and development initiatives, or from public-private
partnerships. In this form, it may or may not become available as an input for
open research in the future, depending upon the modalities of intellectual
property protection – including permanent rights in collections of data – that
investors obtain under national and international law.
Further complicating any assessment of appropriate international action
affecting the provision of knowledge as a global public good is the fact that its
positive role in domestic systems of innovation, though palpable and
universally recognized, is not well understood nor fully elaborated. Nor do
the most successful systems of innovation demonstrate any common or
universal set of practices in this respect that could readily be transcribed to the
international level.
In the United States, for example, especially during the Cold War period,
massive amounts of federal money were spent on producing data and
research, usually through universities and other scientific institutes. Under
traditional US law, all government-generated data automatically entered the
public domain, where this gave a huge fillip to both public and private
research. Most publicly funded research results likewise became widely
159
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available under both the sharing ethos of science and ‘open access’ policies
that federal funding agencies imposed.161
Recently, however, funds for government-generated data have shrunk; and
there is a growing tendency for government agencies to license such data from
the private sector under increasingly restrictive conditions. Moreover,
government-funded research results are increasingly transferred to the private
sector under exclusive patent rights,162 made possible by the Bayh-Dole Act
of 1980.163 New IPRs in digital transmissions and collections of data may
further augment the privatization of government-funded research at the
expense of the scientific community’s sharing ethos and traditional open
access policies.164
In the European Union, in contrast, government-generated data were
traditionally subject to exclusive property rights, and some recent research
suggests that this practice greatly hampered development in some sectors,
such as weather-related innovation. 165 At the same time, government-funded
research in the EU is increasingly likely to be transferred to the private sector
through patents, while all collections of data – including publicly funded data
– have become subject to powerful and potentially permanent exclusive
property rights under the EC Directive on Databases of 1996.166 The impact
of these measures on overall research and development in the EU remains to
be seen, but the scientific community there has voiced growing concerns.167
Practices with respect to the provision of knowledge as a public good in
developing countries are quite different and even harder to evaluate. Here
there has always been a disproportionately large reliance on the public sector,
with uneven but sometimes commendable results.168 However, efforts to
open up previously ‘command economies’ to private enterprise in these
countries have put new pressures on existing modes of producing knowledge
goods in the public sector, and new modes of transferring knowledge from the
public to the private sector are badly needed in any case. As the drive to
stimulate investments in private research and development acquires momentum in more developing countries, careful thought will have to be given to
161
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preserving and enhancing a public sector research infrastructure that was
formerly taken for granted.
This brief survey confirms that ensuring the provision of knowledge as an
essential public good in an incipient transnational system of innovation would
be extremely difficult to manage under the best of circumstances owing to the
diversity of practices among existing systems and to the changes underway
within these systems. This task is made still more difficult by relentless
pressures to ratchet up international standards of intellectual property
protection without regard to, and often at the expense of, traditional modes
of generating knowledge as a public good.
This one-sided push for privatization requires a collective response aimed at
preserving the roles of both knowledge and competition as international
public goods. Calibrating this response, however, is difficult precisely because
national experiences in technology-exporting countries are both diverse and
changing, while the challenge and problems of protecting investment in
cutting-edge technologies today makes reliance on even the most successful
national solutions of the past problematic.
2. Nurturing a transnational system of innovation
This perplexity gives rise to a troubling conundrum. Without an organized,
collective movement to promote and enhance the supply of knowledge as a
public good, the transnational system of innovation taking root in the wake of
the TRIPS Agreement could become suboptimal and skewed from the outset.
Yet, without a lengthy period of experimentation in both developed and
developing countries, policymakers lack the experience and data to
confidently design the balance of public and private interests that should
prevail in that same system. This conundrum in itself constitutes a valid
justification for a moratorium on international intellectual property standardsetting exercises, and it underscores the need for national and regional
experiments that could shed more light on how a transnational market for
knowledge goods should ultimately be structured.
To the extent that developing countries could successfully ensure that their
respective systems of innovation promoted healthy competition in knowledge
goods while otherwise delivering an adequate supply of public goods, they
could more readily and capably articulate these same interests in multilateral
negotiations affecting the future shape of a transnational system of innovation.
This experience would arm them with serious counter-proposals to avoid the
excesses of intellectual property protection that some developed countries
have embraced.
The long-term prospects for an emerging worldwide system of innovation
ultimately depend on the level of investment it attracts, on the quantity and
quality of innovation it stimulates, and on the degree of healthy competition it
sustains. While intellectual property law will necessarily play a crucial role in
attaining positive outcomes, such a system cannot fulfill its promise if it
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becomes prematurely shackled by the intellectual property policies and norms
favored by any particular group of powerful companies or countries. On the
contrary, the evidence shows that small- and medium-sized companies
continue to generate the bulk of real technological advances,169 and any
regulatory scheme developed for this system must take their needs and
interests into account.
Pro-competitive pressures generated from within the emerging transnational system of innovation could then reverberate upon highly protectionist
national systems in developed countries. They could embolden, if not
empower, coalitions of small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs there to seize
the political initiative and recalibrate the balance of public and private
interests in their domestic intellectual property regimes.
It is well to remember that the law and economics disciplines still know
relatively little about how an incipient transnational system of innovation
should best be organized and regulated in the short and medium terms.
Countries big and small, rich and poor, find themselves at the start of a new
era, in which serious thought and bold experimental undertakings will be
needed to identify the optimal mix of public and private goods in this
broadened but largely uncharted domain. The one sure conclusion that
follows from this analysis is that hardening past experience into possibly
flawed international rules to regulate this emerging transnational system
should be avoided. What is needed, instead, is a long period of experimentation under pro-competitive conditions that could yield instructive ‘laboratory
effects’ comparable to those that gradually led to the progressive development
of international intellectual property law after the Berne and Paris
Conventions – the ‘Great Conventions’ – were established in the 1890s.
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